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„According to Seattle, an American Indian chief, the earth is not the white man‟s sister, it is 
his enemy. He says: Carry on contaminating your beds and one night you will be suffocated 
by your own rubbish‟. (Eduardo Galeano, Memoria del Fuego). 
 
„In June 1996, 640 tons of urban Californian trash ended up in a suburb of Beijing, China: 
faced with a stinking pile of refuse containing sewage, used syringes, and a decomposing dog, 
the „China Daily‟ Newspaper stated: “if the U.S. government is concerned about human 
rights, it should … stop the dirty business.” (Ajello and Ranawana, 1996)‟ (in Mandel, 1999: 
66). 
 
Introduction 
 
Among all organisms inhabiting the planet, only humans generate masses of non-
reducible waste. The problems of waste management and rubbish disposal are 
absolutely central and yet generally overlooked issues for a hyper-consumer society.  
These problems lead to uncomfortable questions and as with Al Gore‟s message about 
the challenge posed to human society by climate change, at the heart of these 
questions there is an „inconvenient truth‟ about the crisis of waste that „rubbish 
society‟ brings with it and that urgently needs to be addressed (O‟Brien, 2007; 
Girling, 2005). According to Rosenthal (2008), across continental Europe and in the 
USA, 
 
… longstanding landfill sites are filling up quickly, and in Europe‟s small 
spaces there is little room for new ones. The problem has made it imperative 
for European nations to cut their waste.  
By 2020, the European Union will require member nations to reduce the 
amount of trash sent to landfills to 35 percent of what it was in 1995. It has 
already begun severely restricting and reducing the use of landfills, aka 
garbage dumps, because of the host of health and environmental problems 
they produce.  
But none of this will be easy. Italy, Spain, Greece and Britain each still send 
more than 60 percent of their garbage to landfills. A recent study found that 
they, as well as Ireland and France, are unlikely to meet those long-term 
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landfill targets. In 2006, the United States sent 55 percent of its waste to 
landfills, according to the Environmental Protection Agency. 
 
Responding to the „inconvenient truth‟ of impending waste management collapse will 
require changes in individual and social behaviours. In turn, such changes will require 
motivation, perhaps based on the exercise of incentives, encouragements to 
compliance or forms of regulation. This is necessary because finding workable and 
palatable alternatives to mass consumerism and hence mass waste production is 
harder and less attractive than engaging in denial and employing techniques that help 
us to neutralise – at least psychologically – the scale and significance of the problem 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957). However change is also difficult for other reasons, not least 
because waste disposal is highly profitable big business and attractive to both 
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. In short, waste generates „dirty capitalism‟ and 
„toxic crimes‟.  
 
Green criminology, environmental injustice and the avoidance of responsibility 
Recent studies, covered by various terms such as green, environmental, conservation 
or eco-criminology (Lynch, 1990; South and Beirne, 1998; Beirne and South, 2007; 
Sollund, 2008; White, 2008; Herbig and Joubert, 2006; Walters, 2010), have fused 
elements of critical criminology and environmental awareness and produced a now 
substantial body of work examining criminological and public health consequences of 
environmental harms and injustice. Given the evident problems posed by 
environmental damage and pollution, Simon (2000: 635) suggests that only a form of 
„institutionalised insensitivity to right and wrong‟ can explain continuing 
environmental victimization, injustice and violations of environmental and corporate  
crime laws. At the global level, Simon indicts the waste industry for activities that are 
all the more devastating because „most of its victims include the least powerful people 
on the face of the earth, poverty-stricken people of color, most of whom are powerless 
to resist the environmental deviance of multinational firms.‟ (ibid: 639). Many studies 
have drawn attention to this environmental victimization of communities of the poor 
and powerless due to the frequency with which their locations may be the sites of, for 
example, polluting industry, waste processing plants or other environmentally 
hazardous facilities (Bullard, 1994; Williams, 1996; Lynch and Stretesky, 2001).  In 
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the following paragraphs, a few illustrative examples are provided before we move 
onto our main case study. 
From the 1940s to 2010 
In the 1940s, Love Canal was an abandoned navigation canal used by a company 
called Hooker Chemical as a convenient disposal dump for thousands of drums of 
toxic chemical waste (Szasz, 1994: 42). In 1952 the canal was covered up and one 
year later Hooker sold the land to the Niagara Falls Board of Education. A school was 
built. Developers built homes and "unsuspecting families" moved in. In the 1970s, 
after heavy rains, chemical wastes began to seep to the surface, both on the school 
grounds and into people's yards and basements. Federal and state officials confirmed 
the presence of eighty-eight chemicals, some in concentrations 250 to 5,000 times 
higher than acceptable safety levels. Eleven of these chemicals were suspected or 
known carcinogens; others were said to cause liver and kidney ailments. (ibid.)  
Also dating from the 1940s was the operation of the massive steel works at Corby in 
the county of Northamptonshire, England. During its 46 year history, this „680 acre 
site had produced a dizzying array of dangerous waste – nickel, chromium, zinc, 
arsenic, boron and cadmium‟ (Gordon, 2009) but when the time came to close and 
dismantle the plant through the 1980s and 1990s, it was as if Love Canal and 
numerous developments in public health awareness and waste management had never 
happened. The local authority had taken control of the site and now needed to dispose 
of the waste from the old steel works and this they proceeded to do, „in the back of 
open lorries, sludge spilling onto the public roads of the town‟ with one local 
remembering „the smell and the metallic taste of it, and how if you drove behind one 
of the lorries, your car always ended up covered in a light film.‟ (ibid). Reporting as 
the High Court heard a group litigation case against Corby Borough Council at the 
end of July 2009, Gordon (31
st
 July, 2009) records that the court heard how  
waste was dumped all over Corby by staff that Mr Justice Akenhead described 
this week as being “unqualified and insufficiently experienced”; a waste 
management expert who saw how the materials were disposed of, was said to 
have been “appalled”. Even at the time that the land was being “reclaimed”, an 
auditor described the operation as “naïve, cavalier and incompetent.” … after 
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a ten year battle, the Judge ruled that Corby Borough Council had been 
negligent and that the dumping of toxic material may have caused birth defects 
in children. 
This was a case described by lawyers acting for the affected families as „the biggest 
child poisoning case since Thalidomide‟ (Gammell, 29th July 2009) yet at the end of 
the day, not only did local government, health and environment regulatory bodies 
dismally fail in their responsibilities but it may be that justice is still denied the 
families if they are unable to prove causation between the toxic materials disturbed 
and distributed during decommissioning of the works and the instances of birth 
defects in individual children (Semple Fraser, 2009). 
Such „toxic tragedies‟ (Cass, 1996) are commonplace internationally, frequently 
exhibiting characteristics such as: difficulty of prosecution due to problems in 
drawing together evidence that can tie commercial operations to specific illegal 
offences; cases of corruption; and strong industry „profit-at-all-costs‟ motivations 
(Cass, 1996: 110-112). In the latter case, the rationality of a business enterprise may 
lead to deliberate choice of criminal activity due to the low chance of detection, 
difficulty of proof of guilt and options for „fixing‟ cases should they come to the 
attention of rule- or law-enforcers or even the courts (Cass, 1996: 112 drawing on 
Sutherland, 1949). Within this general pattern may be found what Gobert and Punch 
(2003: 27) refer to as „crime facilitative industries in which one can discern a 
recurring and disproportionate pattern of criminal activity. Persons with a criminal 
record may be attracted by the opportunities provided by these industries, seeing in 
them the potential for remunerative illicit business‟. Gobert and Punch draw on the 
work of Huisman and Niemajer (1998) to identify some of the features that may make 
elements of the Netherlands waste disposal business prone to rule-bending and 
criminal opportunism. It seems highly likely that the same features will be found more 
broadly across international boundaries. 
Companies are paid prior to delivery and, as a result, are easily tempted to take 
on contracts they cannot possibly fulfil. They then will turn to illegal methods 
for satisfying their obligations. The firms involved are typically small and run 
by managers with a dominant managerial style but few qualifications. By 
providing high rewards and/or by establishing dependency relationships, 
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managers who are averse to regulation and unions are nonetheless able to 
create a loyal workforce. At the same time these managers will strive to forge 
good contacts with government officials, employing professional consultants 
to advise them on how to portray an image of being environmentally friendly 
… Behind this façade the companies will consciously and systematically 
violate the law. 
Mandel (1999: 66) describes the business of such violators as „unsanctioned 
hazardous materials transfers‟, moving unwanted, frequently toxic, waste from 
regulated spaces to sites where weak or no opposition will be encountered and from 
developed to developing nations, all part of a global industry of various „deadly 
transfers‟ occurring across a „disorderly world'.  Mandel (1999: 66) provides notable 
examples of this rather one-sided trade: 
Between August 1987 and May 1988, in a deal arranged by an Italian trader 
with a Nigerian national, five ships transported over 8,000 drums containing 
3,800 tons of hazardous wastes (some of which contained PCBs, some of the 
world‟s most toxic pollutants) from various European countries and the United 
States to Koko, Nigeria; when residents near the dirt lot where the waste was 
dumped fell seriously ill and Nigerian officials found falsely labeled leaky 
drums full of the waste, the Italian government eventually had to send two 
ships to pick up the waste and to return it to Italy and repackage it for disposal.  
The principal case study, presented later, might suggest that a note of caution and 
scepticism be attached to the apparent resolution of this particular affair but in both 
this and the next example, what is striking is the neo-colonialist assumptions about 
legitimacy of using less developed countries as dumping grounds for the waste of the 
over-developed nations. 
In spring 1987 the Mexican navy had to prevent forcibly the unsanctioned 
dumping by an American garbage barge of over 3,000 tons of hazardous 
wastes in Mexico: a common reaction to the incident was that it exemplified 
the “scorn” some in the United States felt toward Mexico, viewing it as their 
“outhouse”. (Singh and Lakhan, 1989: 889, 895; in Mandel, 1999: 66). 
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Just over twenty years later, a case highly reminiscent of the two above began to make 
international headlines. In 2009 a major waste disposal multinational, Trafigura, was 
being sued in London's High Court by thousands of Africans reporting injuries which 
they attributed to toxic waste that was landed and disposed of on 19
th
 August 2006, in 
and around Ivory Coast's largest population centre, the city of Abidjan (Jones and 
MacKean, 2009). According to the BBC news programme Newsnight (13
th
 May 
2009), this was „the biggest toxic dumping scandal of the 21st century‟ (at least so far) 
and „the type of environmental vandalism that international treaties are supposed to 
prevent‟. The toxicity of this waste was confirmed by a toxicology expert consulted 
by the BBC who observed that such a combination (which included „tons of phenols 
which can cause death by contact, tons of hydrogen sulphide, lethal if inhaled in high 
concentrations, and vast quantities of corrosive caustic soda and mercaptans‟) could 
„bring a major city to its knees‟(Newsnight report, 13th May 2009).  Apart from the 
High Court action, there is an additional legal development of note that followed from 
this episode. This is of some significance for this area of environmental crime and law 
enforcement.  
Responding to this case in the same year, the EU Commissioner for the Environment, 
Stavros Dimas, reported that this was unfortunately only one of many such incidents 
and that „51% of EU waste shipments in 2005 were found to be illegal‟, a staggering 
proportion (and not including, of course, those shipments not detected as illegal). In 
response, in 2007 the European Commission proposed that a EU-wide framework of 
criminal penalties should be established to address the problem of companies that 
manage to avoid serious punishment by identifying and operating from those 
jurisdictions with the least stringent or punitive laws: „„Member states have very 
different ways of punishing environmental pollution‟ said the commission official, so 
things are done in the country „where there are least sanctions‟‟ (Mahoney, 2007). 
Regrettably, this attempt to unify and standardise penalties across the EU was rejected 
by the European Court of Justice in October that year, arguing that while the EU 
could oblige member states to introduce penalties for pollution, it could not determine 
„the type and level of the criminal penalties to be applied‟. As with much 
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environmental legislation this potentially leaves protections and penalties open to 
dilution and means the opportunity to close loopholes that enable polluters to take 
advantage of jurisdiction in the most lenient and facilitating host country available has 
been missed. A number of other problems emerge in the debate of environmental law, 
a brief summary of which is provided in the section that follows. 
Environmental law  
 
Environmental law can be described as a conceptual hybrid, in that its doctrinal 
content largely derives from principles enunciated in other legal contexts. It is 
inspired, on the one hand, by public law, consisting of sets of regulations, procedural 
constraints, and control processes. It contains, on the other hand, elements of private 
law, where it affects property and other recognised rights and interests. „Therefore, 
there can be a sense that environmental law discourse is ultimately shackled by a 
dependent, satellite status, a repository of greener values, but for the most part 
swimming against a distinctively ungreen tide of prevailing legal priorities‟ 
(Stallworthy, 2008: 4-5). Environmental law, in other words, suffers the legacy of 
legal reasoning geared to the protection of socio-economic systems heavily orientated 
towards unfettered industrial growth, production and consumption. 
   Increasing commitment to market freedom has created a situation in which ethics, 
education and the „invisible‟ mechanisms of the economy itself are seen as the only 
regulatory tools upon which states are expected to rely. Critics, however, argue that 
legal control cannot be discarded, and that strategies require „legal embeddedness” if 
they are to succeed. „The environment needs good law if it is to avoid suffering 
further serious harm‟ (Wilkinson, 2002: 8). ). More specifically, laws are faced with 
the challenges posed by the following three categories of conduct: a) legal persons 
discharging substances in accordance with the conditions established by a licence; b) 
legal persons discharging substances in breach of their licence; c) legal persons 
discharging substances without holding a licence (Wolf and Stanley, 2003). It may be 
true, as Stallworthy (2008: 1) argues, that environmental law is evolving „to the stage 
that it has developed a coherent basis of applicable theory and principles‟. It has to be 
stressed, however, that such law has mainly focused upon the second and third 
category mentioned above, namely on the harm caused by white collar, corporate or 
conventional offenders, while the damage caused by industrial development itself has 
remained largely unaddressed. And yet, the reach of environmental law could 
potentially introduce into legal discourse „long unasked questions as to the ecosystem 
and biodiversity protection, as well as appropriate conditions for access and use of 
natural resources‟ (ibid: 3). 
   In response to such problems, the notion of inter-generational equity has been set 
forth, namely a theory of „justice between generations‟ identifying obligations and 
rights enforceable in international law. According to this theory, each generation 
receives a natural and cultural legacy from previous generations that it holds in trust 
for succeeding ones. This partnership between the living, the dead, and the unborn 
entails „a duty on mankind to pass on to succeeding generations a planet at least as 
healthy as the one it inherited so that each generation will be able to enjoy its fruits‟ 
(Kofele-Kale, 2006: 324). It is hard to establish, however, how such moral obligation 
lends itself to be turned into a legal one. Some authors tend to see its fairness and 
concerns as perfectly suitable for incorporation into statutory legal principles (Wolf 
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and Stanley, 2003). Others, by contrast, criticise governments for their unwillingness 
or inability to translate such moral obligation into radical regulatory measures. In an 
effort to balance business interest with public interest, governments can at most 
implement policies that limit rather than eliminate environmental damage. Such 
measures may include the „polluter pays‟ rule, whereby businesses should internalise 
the costs of the pollution they generate; „eco-taxes‟, which are expected to encourage 
firms to reduce the environmental impact of their activities; and „emissions trading‟ 
an „eco instrument‟ which establishes the maximum level of „pollution credits‟ for 
businesses. „Over time, the regulator reduces the number of credits in circulation and 
this results in an increase in the price of the credits. This provides a financial incentive 
for participating firms to reduce their need for credits by developing less polluting 
methods of production‟ (Wolf and Stanley, 2003: 18). 
    Critics of these „eco instruments‟ remark that environmental law as a whole has 
proved a colossal failure, despite good intentions and the hard work of many citizens, 
lawyers and government officials. Agencies are accused of adopting an excessive 
degree of discretion in their statutes so that continuing damage to the atmosphere and 
other natural resources is allowed. In response, a „public trust doctrine‟ is advocated 
as a fundamental mechanism to ensure governmental protection of environment and 
of public welfare and survival. „At the core of this doctrine is the principle that every 
sovereign government holds vital natural resources in “trust” for the public‟. In this 
way, a shift is encouraged from a system driven by political discretion to „one that is 
infused with public trust principles and policies across all branches of government and 
at all jurisdictional levels‟ (Wood: 2009: 43). The expansion of the public‟s res would 
add new quantifiable assets to the range of collective protected interests. „While the 
courts have traditionally focused on water and wildlife resources in applying the 
public trust, the new climate-altered world demands a far more encompassing 
definition of the public‟s natural res‟ (ibid: 78). 
Ecocide, Geocide and the Polluter-Industrial Complex 
It is as difficult to establish uncompromising principles in environmental law as it is 
to apply them with consistency, if at all. Different interests (aligned or conflicting) 
between social groups may determine whether or not certain conducts are deemed  
deserving of prohibition and legislation in the first place (Szasz, 1986; South, 2009: 
42). Powerful offenders can manage to reject criminal definitions applied to them, 
while powerful groups in general constantly strive to persuade legislators that the 
imposition of norms of conduct on them would be detrimental to all (Ruggiero, 2000). 
In the case of powerful actors whose conduct impacts on the environment, moreover, 
the ready-made rationalisation is at hand according to which, a law imposing limits to 
the harm they cause implicitly shatters the core values of economic development, 
therefore of collective wellbeing. According to Faber (2009: 83), the „polluter-
industrial complex‟ is committed „to discrediting the environmental movement, and to 
weakening the government programs and policies that promote environmental justice, 
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protect public health and safeguard the earth‟.  Boekhout van Solinge (2008: 26) notes 
how some legal scholars have put forward proposals that would move legislation 
radically forward in ways that would enshrine rights to environmental justice and 
environmental health as well as principles of sustainability. For example, Gray (1996) 
has proposed a civil law liability of „ecocide‟, defined as „causing or permitting harm 
to the natural environment on a massive scale‟ which would „breach a duty of care 
owed to humanity in general‟,  an approach derivable from international law and 
commitments to human rights to life and to health. In similar terms, Berat (1993) has 
argued for adoption of the concept of „geocide‟ as a means of framing the violations 
of health and environmental rights that follow from intentional destruction of species 
and habitats (Boekhout van Solinge, 2008: 26). However these propositions are, at 
present, probably unlikely to meet with international agreement and in this normative 
void, green criminologists  may therefore find themselves in a situation where acting 
as „green moral entrepreneurs‟, focusing on harm rather than criminalised conduct, 
becomes one of the few available options.     
In the first part of this paper, we have outlined the concerns of green criminology with 
principles of environmental justice.  Various writers have exposed failures of 
regulation and avoidance of responsibility and have contributed to the production of 
relevant recommendations for the kinds of policy and legislation required for the 
defence of the earth. In the second part, the focus shifts onto conducts which are not 
adopted in a normative void but are violations of even the limited and inconsistent 
existing norms. As we shall see, after discussing such conducts, relating to the case of 
Naples and the „rubbish crisis‟ experienced by this Italian city, an analysis of the 
novel ways in which white collar and organised crime are connected will be 
necessary.  
 
Rubbish tsars and new entrepreneurs 
 
In Naples, local administrators have failed, or more likely avoided, to find a solution 
to rubbish disposal due to the presence within its territory of a myriad of groups with 
a vested interest in this specific industry. Fear of losing political support has led the 
local authorities to contract to a large number of small companies the business of 
garbage management, despite the dysfunctional effects such unregulated segmentation 
 10 
visibly caused. This distribution of „favours‟, which some would attribute to the 
peculiar Neapolitan way of practising the principles of democracy, in reality, is seen 
by Vilfredo Pareto (1966) as a fundamental feature of democracy itself. In the 
„cynical‟ analysis of Pareto, the essence of democracies is the patron-client 
relationship, a relationship based for the most part upon economic interests.  
 
„In such systems, democratic participation is achieved by courtesy of a vast 
number of mutually dependent hubs of influence and patronage, which keeps 
together by the fact that each hub is dependent to some extent on the good 
graces of another such hub‟ (ibid: 67).  
 
The task of these systems, in order to maintain their stability, is to aggregate the 
various centres of patronage, the various clienteles, in such a way that they are all 
satisfied.  
 
              This Paretian arrangement, however, proved politically effective but economically 
disastrous in Naples, to the point that in 1994 an „Extraordinary Commissioner for 
Rubbish‟ was appointed by central government. The small companies, in other words, 
proved competent in ensuring consensus and votes but inept in delivering the services 
entrusted to them. The newly appointed Commissioner, however, lacking the 
awareness of the local political alchemy, found no cooperation in the region of 
Campania and its capital Naples. As an outsider, he proved unable to elaborate a plan 
likely to be supported by the several groups of interest involved. The task, therefore, 
was given to a local representative, the Governor of the Region itself, Antonio 
Rastrelli. This politician of the Right planned an ambitious large-scale integrated 
cycle which included differentiated collection of garbage, its dumping in controlled 
sites, its transformation into compressed materials termed „ecoballs‟, and the 
conversion of the latter into combustible oil. This, finally, was to be sent to 
incinerators and turned into electricity.  
   Only in 1998 did this ambitious plan go out to tender, and when the winning 
company was offered the contract in the year 2000, Antonio Bassolino from the Left 
became Governor of the Campania region. Signatory of the contract with Bassolino 
was the corporation Impregilo, a conglomerate which included Fisia Italimpianti, 
Badcock Communal GMBH, Deuthsche Babcock Anlage, and Evo Oberhausen. The 
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conglomerate offered suspiciously low costs and took on the commitment to manage 
the whole cycle and build the necessary facilities.  
   It should be noted that the owner of Impregilo is Pier Giorgio Romiti, the son of the 
long-term director of personnel of the Fiat complex, a top manager who switched to 
private large-scale enterprise after serving the largest entrepreneur in the country for 
three decades. Pier Giorgio achieved what his father had long dreamed, investing his 
own capital and gaining a position in the exclusive circle of Italian capitalism no 
longer as an employee but as a proprietor (Astone, 2009) .  
 
Emergency situation 
 
Impregilo showed its negotiating power, based both on the reputation of its family 
ownership and on contingent urgency, by obtaining permission to build disposal sites 
wherever they chose as a reward for charging such a low price for its services. The 
place of Acerra was chosen, namely an area where a new paediatric hospital was due 
to be built. While the inhabitants of Acerra started to riot, it became apparent that, 
even when completed, the prospective disposal sites would only be sufficient to 
process fifteen per cent of the garbage produced in the region (Petrillo, 2009).  
   Impregilo limited its job to the destruction of the rubbish brought by the lorries, 
compressing hundred of thousands of „ecoballs‟, and burying them in some existing 
regional sites, or sending them abroad. According to the agreement between the 
Regional authority and the company, while the whole cycle and plant were being 
completed, some sub-contractors would have been chosen for the disposal of the 
rubbish. This „interim‟ solution, in fact, lasted between 2000 and 2007, when it 
became clear that the old system based on numerous sub-contracts granted to small 
companies had never been abandoned. In fact, the Paretian distribution of favours, as 
described above, intensified, causing frenetic estate activity in the area, with land 
being sold at three to-four times its market value. New small entrepreneurs entered the 
scene, buying land from private owners and, pending improbable authorisation, 
turning it into disposal sites.  
   The new set of adventurous entrepreneurs expanded the already large area of illegal 
waste disposal, stepping up the provision of illicit dumping services to industrialists 
from the North of Italy. In the previous years organised crime based in the Campania 
region had often offered waste-disposal services to firms operating in the North, 
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including those producing poisons such as dioxane. In this respect, investigators had 
already warned that „the seawater of large parts of the Naples province was polluted 
mainly because of unauthorised dumping, which constituted ninety per cent of the 
total waste actually disposed of in the bay of Naples‟ (Ruggiero, 1996: 140).  
   Under the new circumstances, firms set up by organised criminal groups 
proliferated, including improvised lorry owners limiting their role to the 
transportation of garbage. The complicity of local politicians was detectable in the 
hasty, routine authorisations given to such improvised entrepreneurs, some of which 
used cover names of family members or associates without a criminal record. One 
such company, pending assessment of the ecological harm it caused, marketed its 
activity under the cynical denomination „Ecologia 2003‟. The small camorra 
entrepreneurs realised that one kilo of rubbish was worth more than one kilo of 
tomatoes, thus turning as much land as they could into illicit dumping sites. Sites 
previously shut down by the authorities due to their dangerousness for public health 
were also utilised (De Crescenzo, 2008).   
               On 27 June 2007, the investigative judges of Naples brought criminal charges 
against twenty-eight individuals: some managers of Impregilo for „fraud against the 
public administration‟ and some administrators for incapacity to control the work of 
those they commissioned and for their failure to denounce the fraud. After an 
emergency situation lasting fourteen years, and with a waste of money quantifiable at 
about eight billion euros, sixty tons of rubbish were scattered on the streets of the 
Naples province. In the streets of Naples alone there were five thousands.  Pier 
Giorgio Romiti and Antonio Bassolino were identified as the main responsible figures 
and consequently incriminated (De Stefano and Iurrillo, 2009). The former was 
accused of presenting an inadequate, fraudulent, tender while aware that the price 
quoted was unrealistic and that its company lacked the technical capacity to perform 
the job required. The latter was charged with gross negligence and complicity in the 
fraud, having granted an invalid contract and failed to intervene when the improper 
conduct of the beneficiary became manifest. Bassolino displayed public irritation at 
the charges, and justified himself by saying that he had signed the agreement without 
„reading it‟, as he often did: „I sign so many papers!‟ He also argued that a proper 
assessment of the contracts granted to external entities was the remit of  his close 
collaborators, particularly „technicians‟ with the relevant expertise and monitoring 
capacity required (Piccoli, 2008: 15).  
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Dirty collar crime 
 
Some aspects of the case just described are far from unique. As we have seen in the 
first section of this paper, research conducted in previous years has shown that 
processing industrial waste without a licence and sidestepping environmental 
regulations „is cheaper and faster‟. Cases uncovered in the Netherlands proved that 
illegal enterprises may offer service packages which comprise false invoices, 
transport facilities, mendacious chemical reports as to the nature of the substances 
dumped and forged permits to dump. In most European countries some legally 
registered companies also operate illegally. They either establish partnerships with 
legitimate firms or run their own in-house parallel illicit business. The choice between 
the two services is the result of how much the customer is prepared to pay. It is otiose, 
in this respect, to question whether customers are aware of the illegal nature of the 
cheaper option, as its very cheapness speaks for itself (van Duyne, 1993; Brants, 
1994; Moore, 1994). In the USA research indicated that the involvement of organised 
crime reaches all aspects of the business, from the control of which companies are 
officially licensed to dispose of waste to those which earn contracts with public or 
private organisations, and to the payment of bribes to dump site owners or the 
possession of such sites (Block and Scarpitti, 1985; Szasz, 1986; Salzano, 1994).  
   Recent cases which occurred in Germany show that even in countries where the 
legislation is progressive and clear illegal disposal of waste is widespread. Such cases 
emerged when a mismatch was noted between the quantity of waste expected and that 
actually received by incinerators operating in the eastern regions of the country. The 
missing portion of waste was found to have been dumped in illegal disposal sites. 
Entrepreneurs utilising such dumps opted for the cheapest way of waste management, 
thus circumventing the rules which impose a fee of around 200 euros per tonne of 
waste treated (Natale, 2009). Cases also emerged in which the composition of the 
waste treated was falsely certified, so that substances which should have been 
disposed of in special sites were instead dumped in inappropriate ones. That cases 
such as these occur in highly ecologically aware Germany may be surprising. 
However, the paradox is that the development of illegal dumping services runs 
parallel with the very increase in environmental awareness, the latter forcing 
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governments to raise costs for industrial dumping, which indirectly encourages 
industrialists to opt for cheaper, if illicit, solutions.  
   Past and current cases of illegal waste disposal share a key characteristic, displaying 
the dynamic of a specific partnership between the official economy and organised 
crime. Organised crime offers a service to legitimate business and receives in 
exchange opportunities for entrepreneurial development (Ruggiero, 1996). The case 
of Naples, however, offers new material for reflection that may modify previous 
analytical assumptions.  
 
Benefiting from chaos 
 
The judicial investigation was a clear response to widespread stereotypes. First, that  
responsibility for the rubbish crisis was to be directly attributed to organised crime; 
second, that the root of the problem was the demagogy of the environmental 
movement; and third, that local administrations were „Nimby‟, that is they were 
unprepared to host dumping sites in the areas they governed. In fact, organised crime 
found business opportunities courtesy of the inefficiency of legitimate entrepreneurs 
and the „dirty collar offenders‟ operating among them. Moreover, even the trite adage 
whereby entrepreneurs from the north of the country find an unfavourable atmosphere 
for business in the south due to the activities of organised crime proved totally 
inaccurate. The case discussed above shows that the prime beneficiaries of the chaotic 
situation were the very actors who produced it, namely the legitimate companies who, 
after giving organised crime a chance to offer their services, blamed organised crime 
itself for their own incapacity to deliver what was required by contract. Among the 
other benefits gained was a request for more funds to perform a job which, as it was 
claimed, was hampered by chaos and by the insatiable demands for protection money 
made by local criminal groups. Dirty collar crime, in brief, created a particularly 
favourable climate for business: causing chaos boosted profits. False blame allocation 
also proved ineffective with regard to the purported demagogy of the local 
environmental movement and unwillingness of the local authorities to host waste 
disposal sites on their territories. The investigation made it clear that the former 
started its mobilisation only when unauthorised sites were used, including a site 
destined for the construction of a new paediatric hospital. Local administrators, in 
their turn, were proven not only to be well prepared to have dumping sites 
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legitimately built in the territories they governed, but also to turn a blind eye when 
illegitimate ones provided a hasty solution to the emergency situation.   
 
From Landesco to Block and Chambliss 
 
When John Landesco (1929) described the structure, cultural background and 
operations of organised  crime in Chicago, he highlighted the ties of mutual interest 
that mobsters established with the police, entrepreneurs and customers for the goods 
and services they supplied. Such ties, generally hidden from public view, often 
became manifest at weddings, funerals, political banquets and other occasions that 
brought the community together. In a fascinating chapter on the funerals of gangsters, 
Landesco remarked that, while in life one may conceal personal ties, in death one 
cannot avoid disclosing them. Additionally, at other venues such as political meetings 
and banquets, the politics-business-crime nexus was visually inescapable, with the 
City Hall attaché drinking next to racketeers, businessmen and police officers, all 
discussing ways of helping each other in their respective entrepreneurial efforts. 
However, even this unedifying description is superseded by the case examined above. 
Landesco‟s detailed analysis confirms that often the official economy and organised 
crime are engaged in an exchange of services and a mutual entrepreneurial promotion. 
The garbage crisis in Naples displays some traits that enable this analysis to be taken 
further, approaching definitions provided by Block (1991) and Chambliss (1978). The 
former suggests that the term „organised crime‟ should be abandoned altogether in 
favour of the term „illegal enterprise‟. The latter, after a long period of participant 
observation spent in the underworld, concludes that organised crime consists of 
businessmen, politicians, and a minority formed by members of criminal syndicates.  
 
Così fan tutti 
 
The Naples case shows that organised crime is able to penetrate the legitimate 
economy when the latter provides facilitating openings and apposite entrepreneurial 
space. The encounter between organised crime groups and business, in other words, 
does not amount to an unnatural meeting between a dysfunctional and a harmonious 
entity, but between opportunity seekers who are equally prepared to creatively bend 
 16 
the rules. A harmonious economy would immediately detect unorthodox operations 
and single out crooked operators, thus excluding adventurers and criminals and 
pushing them back within the narrow confines of the conventional, illicit, economy 
proper. The cases presented, instead, show that a mutual learning process is in place 
whereby criminal techniques „migrate‟ from one group to another, from legitimate to 
illegitimate entrepreneurs, and vice versa. The former learn from the latter the way in 
which public resources can be ransacked, while the latter learn from the former how 
fraud is a substantial aspect of business (Ruggiero, 2007). We have seen how the 
official companies involved in the garbage crisis in Naples undercharged the local 
administration for a service that they, in reality, were unable and unprepared to 
provide. Similarly, groups of criminals operating in Naples have become legendary 
for their ability to sell so-called „parcels‟, namely items of no value that are 
purportedly quality goods in high demand. „Parcels‟ vary from offering boxes 
presumably containing latest model computers or state of the art mobile phones, while 
the real content of the boxes may consist of stones or mineral water bottles. 
Entrepreneurs involved in the case of Naples sold their own „parcel‟, a fraudulent 
promise of a service which they knew in advance they could not deliver. Both 
legitimate aad illegitimate entrepreneurs contributed to saturate the environment with 
illegality, thus blurring the boundaries between economic initiative and crime. In such 
an environment they found it easy to justify their practices through a typical 
rationalisation (everybody does it) that echoes Mozart‟s opera: Così fan tutti. 
 
Socialism for the rich 
 
The specific „dirty collar crime‟ described in the previous pages shows how business 
can benefit from the very disasters it creates. When small adventurous companies 
entered the scene, along with firms directly or indirectly owned by criminal organised 
groups, the official contractors who had committed themselves to the management of 
waste demanded more public finances to fight chaos and restore order, namely to 
bring the garbage disposal cycle as a whole under their own control. They also used 
the concomitant popular protest as a form of pressure upon the authorities to persuade 
them to release more funds (Brusasco, 2009). Finally, they felt that they were entitled 
to be rescued like other companies experiencing difficulties, whether engaged in the 
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manufacturing or the financial sectors, that had been similarly „bailed out‟. This 
prompts a final, more general observation. The very notion of enterprise in past 
centuries, gained acceptance in the collective sensibility because entrepreneurs, while 
creating goods and providing jobs, risked their own resources in ventures whose 
outcomes were more or less unpredictable. Failure to keep a company healthy 
immediately turned into the risk of exclusion from markets. Dirty collar criminals, by 
contrast, translate their own failure into novel opportunities for profit; they avoid the 
uncertainties of private markets, opting for more secure sources of income within the 
public sphere. Their lack of genuine economic initiative is reflected by their targeting 
of institutions and collective actors rather than clusters of private consumers. 
Moreover, when they fail they remove the variable risk and divert it onto the 
collectivity, requiring assistance from the state, and while publicly advocating 
liberalism, they aim at the construction of a form of socialism exclusively tailored for 
the rich.    
 
Conclusion 
 
In the principal case study here, corrupt procedures, incompetent administration, 
criminal entrepreneurship and corporate profiteering all overlap as contributors to 
outcomes of severe environmental offences and public health hazards. In other cases, 
described earlier, different combinations of these elements apply but the problems of 
ineffective response and avoidance of responsibility are common to all. These are 
crimes of toxic capitalism, in which legal dirty-collar offenders and illegal organised 
crime seek out and exploit „negotiably-regulated' spaces. Even where regulations and 
controls are operating and asserted these drive some behaviours underground, create 
profitable enterprises to bypass them and are unable to change values and incentives 
that favour environmentally bad outcomes. Such outcomes are problematic and 
damaging in a variety of ways: to law, civic life, and public health.  
 
The difficulties of finding appropriate and effective legal or civil remedies in this 
particular arena of environmental harms and crimes are now well known and 
problems of inadequacy of arrangements and resources for enforcement of rules and 
laws are commonplace and described internationally (Hutter, 1986; du Rees, 2001; De 
Prez, 2000). This situation applies across a range of related organised, corporate and 
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white-collar crimes involving „breaches of health, safety, environmental, consumer or 
food legislation committed by both large multi-national corporations and local 
businesses‟ (Croall, 2009: 167). Organised forms of crime operating as illegal 
enterprises, frequently with legal fronts, tend to avoid effective sanction and 
disruption by means of intimidation, corruption and value to legitimate business as a 
way of „externalising criminogenesis‟ (Szasz, 1986: 23). Where such enterprises and 
their offences are treated as corporate crime, the law is often found to be, as Punch 
(2009: 52) puts it, „weak, if not impotent‟: „The law is in a sense merely paper, a 
statement of moral disapproval or intent, or what is referred to as the „law in the 
books‟‟.  Clearly the forms of response and methods of rule- and law-enforcement 
available to local, national and international bodies formally responsible for 
environmental protection (albeit that these are sometimes lacking in demonstration of 
such responsibility in practice), are limited in scope and impact. In moving forward, 
new tools and arrangements are needed but it should not be forgotten that there will 
also be much to remember, re-learn and apply anew from past encounters with 
enterprise crime, corrupt government and fraudulent businesses. 
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